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Mistaken Interpretation: The American Arbitration Association,
Green Tree Financial Corporation v. Bazzle, and the Real State of
Class-Action Arbitration in North Carolina
The United States Supreme Court, in Green Tree Financial
Corporation v. Bazzle,1 held that an arbitrator, rather than a court, must
decide whether an arbitration clause is silent as to the allowance of
class-action arbitration.2 The American Arbitration Association ("AAA"),
however, claims Green Tree gives its arbitrators the authority not only to
decide that question, but also to go even further and decide whether
class-action arbitration is allowed when the contract is silent.' This is a
mistaken interpretation of Green Tree. The Supreme Court did not address
the issue of whether an arbitrator may determine if class-action arbitration
is appropriate when the contract is silent on the issue. Additionally, the
Court's silence cannot be taken as an implicit authorization for arbitrators
to take this power upon themselves. This Recent Development will argue
that contrary to the AAA's mistaken interpretation, Green Tree authorizes
each state, not an individual arbitrator, to determine whether it will permit
class-action arbitration when agreements are silent on the issue and that
North Carolina should allow class-action arbitration when the agreement is
silent.4
This argument will begin by examining the Green Tree case and its
holding regarding agreements that are silent on class-action arbitration.
Because South Carolina law governed the decision in Green Tree, this
discussion will proceed by evaluating three policy issues implicit in South
Carolina's position that "class-wide arbitration may be ordered when the
1. 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
2. Id. at 452-53.
3. See American Arbitration Association: Policy on Class Arbitration, at
http://www.adr.org/index2.1 .jsp?JSPssid= 16235&JSPsrc=upload/livesite/Rules-ProceduresrTopi
csInterest/AAA%20Class%20Action%2OPolicy.htm ("In its June 23, 2003 decision in Green
Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, the United States Supreme Court held that where an arbitration
agreement was silent regarding the availability of class-wide relief, an arbitrator, and not a court,
must decide whether class relief is permitted.") (last visited Aug. 24, 2004) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
4. This Recent Development will occasionally use the phrase "North Carolina should allow
class-action arbitration when the agreement is silent" or some variation thereof. This is for
purposes of brevity and ease of reading only. It should not be read as undermining the ultimate
point that North Carolina should follow the full language of South Carolina's position that
"class-wide arbitration may be ordered when the arbitration agreement is silent if it would serve
efficiency and equity, and would not result in prejudice." Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 569
S.E.2d 349, 360 (S.C. 2002), vacated by 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
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arbitration agreement is silent if it would serve efficiency and equity, and
would not result in prejudice."5  Finally, after considering these policy
issues, this Recent Development will discuss both the policy arguments and
legal bases supporting a decision by North Carolina to follow South
Carolina to allow class-action arbitration when a contract is silent on the
issue.
Green Tree is a consolidation of two class-action cases, Bazzle v.
Green Tree Financial Corporation and Lackey v. Green Tree Financial
Corporation.6 Both cases involved alleged violations of the South Carolina
Consumer Protection Code.7 Green Tree was the lender in both cases, and,
although the financing purposes differed, "[tihe consumers in both classes
were bound to arbitration by the same clause."8  Both cases proceeded
through long, protracted litigation, arbitration, and appeal9 until the South
Carolina Supreme Court withdrew the appeal, assumed jurisdiction, and
consolidated the cases for appeal °
The South Carolina Supreme Court determined that the arbitration
clauses at issue were silent as to whether the mandated arbitration could
proceed in a class-action manner, 1' and that where agreements are silent on
this issue, class-action arbitration was allowed. 2  The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari, 3 and vacated the judgment of the South
Carolina Supreme Court, and remanded the cases for further proceedings. 4
Green Tree produced four separate opinions 5 that, while running the
5. Id.
6. Bazzle involved financing applications from Green Tree Financial that contained neither
an attorney preference notice nor an insurance agent preference notice as required by the South
Carolina Consumer Protection Code. See Bazzle, 569 S.E.2d at 352. Lackey involved preprinted
consumer installment contracts and security agreements from Green Tree Financial that also
contained no attorney or insurance agent preference notice as required by the South Carolina
Consumer Protection Code. See id. at 353. After filing their cases, both Bazzle and Lackey filed
motions for class certification. See id. at 352-54. These motions, and their subsequent treatment
by the South Carolina courts and the arbitrators in each case, are the subject of the United States
Supreme Court's Green Tree decision.
7. Id. at 352-53.
8. Id. at 354.
9. See id. at 352-54 (discussing thoroughly the procedural history of both cases).
10. Id. at 351.
11. Id. at 359.
12. Id. at 360 (limiting class-wide arbitration to situations where it would be efficient,
equitable, and not prejudicial).
13. 537 U.S. 1098 (2003).
14. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 454 (2003).
15. Writing for the plurality was Justice Breyer joined by Justices Scalia, Souter, and
Ginsburg. Id. at 447-54. Justice Stevens wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment and
dissenting in part. Id. at 454-55. Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent, which was joined by Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy, took the position that the arbitration clause clearly forbade class
arbitration, and that the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court should, therefore, be flatly
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gamut of possible views, produced no majority opinion. Justice Breyer's
opinion, and the four votes it garnered, along with Justice Stevens'
concurrence in the judgment, produced the necessary five votes to vacate
the opinion of the South Carolina Supreme Court and remand the case for
further proceedings.16 When no opinion earns the vote of a majority of the
Court, determining the controlling law is more difficult. However, the
Court has posited that in these situations, the opinion decided on the
narrowest ground should control. 7 Although many of the particular points
of law derived from Green Tree are debatable, both Justice Breyer and
Justice Stevens are in accord as to the only issue that is of consequence to
this Recent Development. Both Justices implicitly agree that it is state law,
and not the decision of an arbitrator, that determines whether or not
class-action arbitration is allowed when the arbitration clause is silent. 8
Justice Breyer commences his opinion with a proposition that forms
the nucleus of the plurality holding: "Are the contracts in fact silent, or do
they forbid class arbitration as petitioner Green Tree Financial Corp.
contends? .. . [W]e cannot ... [resolve that question], not simply because
it is a matter of state law, but also because it is a matter for the arbitrator to
decide."' 9  This statement is followed by three restatements of "the
question": "the question-whether the agreement forbids class
arbitration;"2 "[t]he question here-whether the contracts forbid class
arbitration;"21  and "this underlying question-whether the arbitration
contracts forbid class arbitration."22 Thus, Justice Breyer makes it clear
that the sole question before the Court was whether the arbitrator was the
proper person to make the initial determination that the contract was in fact
silent as to class-action arbitration. The Court did not consider whether the
arbitrator had the authority to determine if class-action arbitration should
overturned. Id. at 455-60 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Additionally, Chief Justice Rehnquist
argued that the terms of the contract provided Green Tree, with the consent of the particular
plaintiff, the right to select an arbitrator for each individual case and that the South Carolina
Supreme Court's decision deprived Green Tree of this contractual right. Id. Finally, Justice
Thomas wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the Federal Arbitration Act "cannot be a
ground for pre-empting a state court's interpretation of a private arbitration agreement." Id. at
460 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Rather, Justice Thomas "would leave undisturbed the judgment of
the Supreme Court of South Carolina." Id.
16. See id. at 454-55.
17. See Marks v. U.S., 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (noting that when no single opinion garners
a majority vote, the opinion decided on the narrowest grounds typically governs future
interpretations of the case).
18. See infra notes 26-33 and accompanying text.
19. Green Tree, 539 U.S. at 447.
20. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 451 (2003).
21. Id. at 452.
22. Id. at 453. Justice Breyer uses the terms agreement, agreements, contract, and contracts
interchangeably throughout his opinion.
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proceed when the contract is silent.
Not only does Justice Breyer consistently refer to the question in the
singular (and clearly state what the question is), but nowhere in his opinion
does Justice Breyer present the proposition that would validate the AAA's
reading of the case23-namely, that after determining whether the contract
forbids class arbitration or is in fact silent (and therefore ambiguous), it is
the job of the arbitrator to determine whether class arbitration should
proceed under a silent clause. 24  The AAA's reading of this opinion as
allowing arbitrators to decide whether class-action arbitration is allowed
when a contract is silent on the issue is incorrect for two reasons. First, as
previously discussed, the Supreme Court only addressed the question,
"[a]re the contracts in fact silent, or do they forbid class arbitration... ?21
Second, the Court implicitly found that determination of whether
class-action arbitration is appropriate when a contract is silent is a
substantive state law26 issue to be resolved by the state. 27 Justice Stevens
recognized this point when he stated, "The Supreme Court of South
Carolina has held as a matter of state law that class-action arbitrations are
permissible if not prohibited by the applicable arbitration agreement ....
There is nothing in the Federal Arbitration Act that precludes ... [this
determination] by the Supreme Court of South Carolina. ''2 8  Implicit in
Justice Stevens' statement is the notion that it was proper for South
Carolina, not the individual arbitrator, to interpret and apply principles of
state law in reaching the decision to allow or disallow class-action
arbitration when the contract is silent on the issue. Like Justice Breyer,
Justice Stevens did not directly address the issue, nor directly state that he
agreed with Justice Breyer on the issue, because the Court only directly
addressed the issue of making the underlying decision as to the contract's
silence regarding class-action arbitration. However, the fact that Justices
Stevens and Breyer did not expressly state that they were in accord on the
issue of a state retaining the power to make and interpret its own
substantive law in the realm of class-action arbitration does not mean that
individual arbitrators can take this substantive law-making power upon
23. See id. at 447-54.
24. See supra note 3.
25. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 447 (2003).
26. Substantive law is that "part of the law that creates, defines, and regulates the rights,
duties, and powers of parties." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1443 (7th ed. 1999).
27. Justice Breyer does not expressly address this issue because the Court only addressed the
issue of whether the arbitrator was the proper person to make the initial determination of whether
the contract was silent as to class-action arbitration. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying
text.
28. Id. at 454-55 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
2004] 2131
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
themselves.29
In defense of the AAA, their mistaken interpretation is not completely
inexplicable as, in the end, the Supreme Court does vacate the judgment of
the South Carolina Supreme Court.3" But, the procedural outcome of
Green Tree should not be over-emphasized, nor should the substance of the
Breyer and Stevens opinions be ignored. A careful reading of Justice
Breyer's opinion produces the unmistakable conclusion that the Supreme
Court vacated the South Carolina Supreme Court's judgment because it
feared the South Carolina trial court's determination that the contract was
silent had influenced the arbitrator to reach the same conclusion.3'
Additionally, he concludes, "we remand the case so that the arbitrator may
decide the question of contract interpretation-thereby enforcing the
parties' arbitration agreements according to their terms."32 This statement
is not only a final example of a reference to the singular question before the
Court, but it also makes clear that, as Justices Breyer and Stevens agree, the
role of the arbitrator is one not of substantive law making but of "contract
interpretation."33
The class-action arbitration discussion does not end with this
deciphering of the Supreme Court's opinion in Green Tree. While some
jurisdictions have already decided the question of whether class-action
arbitration may proceed when the arbitration clause is silent on the issue,34
North Carolina has yet to address the subject. Strong arguments exist in
favor of both positions, but the policy and law of North Carolina demand
that our state follow the path of South Carolina and adopt the position that
"class-wide arbitration may be ordered when the arbitration agreement is
29. See Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 569 S.E.2d 349 (S.C. 2002), vacated by 539 U.S.
444 (2003) and Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192 (Cal. 1982), for examples of the state,
as the proper decision-maker, deciding the issue of whether class-action arbitration was allowed
when the applicable arbitration provision was silent on the issue. While it is true that a state
could theoretically authorize arbitrators to make the decision, it is still the state's right to make
this decision rather than the arbitrator's right to decide of his own volition.
30. Green Tree, 539 U.S. at 454.
31. Id. ("On balance, there is at least a strong likelihood in Lackey as well as in Bazzle that
the arbitrator's decision reflected a court's interpretation of the contracts rather than an
arbitrator's interpretation."). A South Carolina trial court ruled the contract at issue in Bazzle,
identical to the contract in Lackey, authorized class-action arbitration before the Lackey arbitrator
made a decision regarding the Lackey contract. Id. at 453-54.
32. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 454 (2003).
33. Id. at 454-55.
34. See Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269, 275 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that when
an arbitration agreement is silent as to class-action arbitration, class-action arbitration may not
proceed). But see Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1209 (Cal. 1982) (holding that
ordering class-action arbitration when the agreement is silent is permissible "in an appropriate
case"), appeal dismissed in part and rev'd in part on other grounds by Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
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silent if it would serve efficiency and equity, and would not result' in
prejudice. 35
South Carolina's position regarding class-wide arbitration when the
arbitration agreement is silent presents three determinations that must be
made as a matter of policy before adopting the South Carolina position.
First, when is an arbitration agreement silent on the issue of class-action
arbitration? An arbitration agreement is silent on the issue of class-action
arbitration when the language of the agreement does not expressly allow or
disallow class-action proceedings. An arbitration agreement is also silent
regarding class-action arbitration when, absent express language, the terms
of the agreement are not clear enough to imply36 that arbitration can only
proceed in a two-party format.37
The second policy determination posed by South Carolina's position
on class-action arbitration is what it means to serve efficiency and equity.
The short answer is "efficiency" means minimizing effort, expense, or
waste38 and "equity" means fairness.39 Class-actions in the litigation setting
are lauded for saving both time and cost.4" Class-action arbitrations present
the same opportunity for efficiency. Many parties who could not afford to
proceed with arbitration on a two-party basis would be able to have their
claims redressed in a class-action setting.41 In addition, class-action
arbitration would save time for all of those involved by disposing of all
similarly situated plaintiffs in one proceeding.42
35. Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 569 S.E.2d 349, 360 (S.C. 2002).
36. Agreements that do not expressly or implicitly address class-action arbitration may
instead give rise to findings that the clause is silent or, at best, ambiguous, such as in Green Tree.
An ambiguous agreement is one in which the meaning or intention is uncertain. See BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 79 (7th ed. 1999). However, this finding should not ultimately affect the
outcome of the case. See infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text (arguing that, like ambiguous
contract provisions, a contract that is silent in respect to a particular situation should be construed
against the drafter).
37. Two-party arbitration as used in this Recent Development refers to non-class-action
arbitration.
38. See WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 454 (4th ed. 1999).
39. See id. at 481.
40. See generally Maffei v. Alert Cable TV of N.C., Inc., 316 N.C. 615, 620, 342 S.E.2d
867, 871 (1986) (noting the economic advantage of class actions for holders of small claims).
41. See Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269, 277 (7th Cir. 1995) (Rovner, J.,
concurring) (noting "[corporate defendants] typically have far more to gain by forcing unhappy
customers to bear the expense of arbitrating individually").
42. See Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer Contracts:
A Call for Reform, 38 Hous. L. REv. 1237, 1259 (2001) ("No one disputes, however, that in
some cases the class action is the most efficient and effective way to resolve a dispute."). But see
Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1215 (Cal. 1982) (Richardson, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (arguing that class-action arbitration would "interfere with the expeditious
resolution of the claims"), appeal dismissed in part and rev'd in part on other grounds by
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). Also, those potential plaintiffs who opted out of
20041 2133
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Class-action arbitration also serves the equitable notion of fairness for
all similarly situated plaintiffs.43 Similarly situated plaintiffs proceeding
through two-party arbitration with the exact same claim based upon the
exact same form contract may find themselves receiving completely
opposite results based upon the contrary findings of different arbitrators
because the principles of res judicata4 and collateral estoppel45 do not
always apply in the arbitration setting.46 Class-action arbitration, by
disposing of the claims of all similarly situated plaintiffs in one proceeding,
helps reduce this inequitable result.
Finally, the third policy determination posed by South Carolina's
position regarding class-action arbitration is what factors should be
considered in determining whether prejudice to the party opposing
class-action proceedings would result by allowing class-action arbitration
to proceed. Although a defendant could potentially produce a litany of
possible prejudicial concerns, both meritorious and non-meritorious, the
three major concerns would be the risk of increased cost, the potential loss
of substantive rights, and the loss of the drafter's ability to choose the
arbitrator, if that right was in fact the drafter's under the terms of the
agreement.47 Concerns regarding excessive cost increases cannot be
directly assuaged. However, both arbitration proceedings and class-action
judicial proceedings are lauded for saving time and costs, 48 and there is no
the class would not have their claims disposed of with all of the other similarly situated plaintiffs.
43. See In re TMI, 89 F.3d 1106, 1113 (3rd Cir. 1996) (discussing how equity is promoted
by treating similarly situated plaintiffs equally and eliminating inconsistent results in the context
of retroactive application of a Pennsylvania state statute).
44. Res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, bars "the same parties from litigating a
second lawsuit on the same claim, or any other claim arising from the same transaction or series
of transactions and that could have been-but was not-raised in the first suit." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1312 (7th ed. 1999).
45. Collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, bars "a party from relitigating an
issue determined against that party in an earlier action, even if the second action differs
significantly from the first one." Id. at 256.
46. See Kris-Beth, Inc. v. Dist. 17, United Mine Workers of Am., 786 F.2d 1154, 1986 U.S.
App. LEXIS 22979, at *8 n.5 (4th Cir. 1986) (unpublished table decision) (stating the res judicata
effect of a prior arbitration on a subsequent arbitration is an issue for the arbitrator); Capitol City
Lodge 141 v. Eaton County Bd. of Comm'rs, No. 246570, 2004 Mich. App. LEXIS 1676, at *6-
*8 (Mich. Ct. App. June 17, 2004) (citing decisions from the First, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh,
Eighth, Federal, and District of Columbia Circuits regarding the preclusive effect of a prior
arbitration).
47. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 459 (2003) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting) (arguing that by allowing class-action arbitration, the Court is denying Green Tree its
"contractual right to choose an arbitrator for each dispute with the other 3,734 class members,"
and that this is a right Green Tree reasonably would have taken advantage of "to avoid
concentrating all of the risk of substantial damages awards in the hands of a single arbitrator.").
48. See Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., 298 F.3d 778, 787 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting
the "cost-saving benefits of arbitration"); Chandler v. Washtenaw Mortg. Co., No. 94-A-1418-N,
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22788, at *5 (M.D. Ala. July 29, 1998) (commenting on the typical cost
[Vol. 822134
CLASS-ACTION ARBITRATION
reason to believe that these savings would not result if the two proceedings
were combined.
The substantive rights issue is a more significant factor, but it too
weighs on the side of allowing class-actions to proceed. Principles such as
res judicata and collateral estoppel do not always apply in the arbitration
setting,49 so the same issue could be decided in completely opposite ways
in two individual arbitrations. Class-action arbitration allows these
principles to effectively apply because all similarly situated plaintiffs
would be proceeding under the same factual and legal conclusions. Finally,
the inability to choose a new arbitrator for each individual plaintiff's claim,
if the drafting party has the right by contract, is a concern to drafting
parties.50 However, one of the main changes class-action arbitration makes
is simply that the drafting party loses the ability to "arbitrator-shop" from
case to case in the event an arbitrator disagrees with the drafter's position
in a particular case. The loss of this "shopping" option, while possibly
detrimental to a drafting-party-defendant, is not the sort of prejudicial
effect that our system should be concerned with in weighing the "pros and
cons" of class-action arbitration.51
Having considered the three policy issues raised by South Carolina's
position regarding court-ordered class-action arbitration, the ultimate
consideration of why North Carolina should allow class-action arbitration
when the arbitration clause is silent may now be considered. There are
several reasons why North Carolina should allow class-wide arbitration
when the applicable arbitration agreement is silent on the issue. First,
arbitration enjoys a favored place in North Carolina, and class-action
arbitration should enjoy the same favored position. Second, North
Carolina's allowance of consolidated arbitration, and considerations of
North Carolina substantive law regarding the ascertainment of intent in
contracts and the construction of ambiguous contract provisions, support
the allowance of class-action arbitration when the applicable arbitration
provision is silent on the issue. Finally, considerations of the operative
language of section seven 52 of the North Carolina Revised Uniform
Arbitration Act53 and section four of the Federal Arbitration Act 54 also
and time savings of class-action proceedings).
49. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
50. See Green Tree, 539 U.S. 444, 459 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
51. See Supermarkets Gen. Corp. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 645 F.
Supp. 831, 833 (D.C. Conn. 1986) (noting that "[t]here is likewise no policy favoring
'arbitrator-shopping' ").
52. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-569.7 (2003).
53. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-569.1 to .31 (2003). North Carolina's RUAA applies to
arbitration agreements made on or after January 1, 2004. See id. § 1-569.3.
54. 9 U.S.C. § 1-16 (2000).
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support the allowance of class-action arbitration when the applicable
arbitration provision is silent on the issue.
Arbitration holds a favored place in both North Carolina state law55
and federal law56 because of its "simplicity, informality, and expedition."57
Class-action arbitration should hold a similarly favored place for the same
reasons. Opponents argue that arbitration on a class basis, as opposed to
traditional two-party arbitration, is "inefficient instead of efficient, lengthy
instead of expeditious, and procedural instead of informal." 8  This
conclusion would surely be reached if one were to commit the logical
fallacy of comparing class-action arbitration with a single two-party
arbitration, or if one believed the judicial system, though continuously
evolving, is incapable of adapting to this much needed procedure.5 9
Class-action arbitration no doubt appears to be inefficient, lengthy, and
procedural compared to two-party arbitration, just as class-action lawsuits
appear inefficient, lengthy, and procedural compared to "regular" two-party
litigation. But using a single arbitration as the basis of comparison
compares "apples to oranges" instead of "apples to apples." The
appropriate analysis compares all of the single arbitrations that would result
without a class-action proceeding to the class-action arbitration. For
example, the Bazzle component of Green Tree consisted of 1,899
individuals,6" and the argument could scarcely be made that the single
Bazzle class-action arbitration was more inefficient, costly, and lengthy
than the aggregate of each of the 1,899 individual plaintiffs proceeding
singularly through two-party arbitration.
Second, arguments against class-action arbitration also involve
complaints that class-action arbitration would force changes in both the
nature of an arbitration proceeding and the involvement of courts in
arbitration,6" apparently in the belief that the law and the judicial system are
55. See Howard v. Oakwood Homes Corp., 134 N.C. App. 116, 118, 516 S.E.2d 879, 881
(1999) (remarking on North Carolina's strong public policy in favor of using arbitration to settle
disputes).
56. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985)
(noting the federal policy favoring arbitration).
57. Id. at 628.
58. Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1215 (Cal. 1982) (Richardson, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part), appeal dismissed in part and rev'd in part on other grounds by
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
59. See id. at 1214-18 (discussing changes to the judicial system that class-action
arbitrations would require).
60. Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 569 S.E.2d 349, 352-53 (S.C. 2002).
61. See generally Keating, 645 P.2d at 1214-18 (Richardson, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (remarking on perceived necessary changes, including the need to keep records
of arbitration proceedings, the need for arbitrators to explain the grounds for their decisions, and
the larger role courts would play in class-action arbitration as opposed to two-party arbitration).
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incapable of change. However, these arguments ignore the very nature of
the law itself,6 2 and the opportunity to make whole an aggrieved party
should not be abandoned simply because it does not fit neatly under current
rules or procedures. As with all new situations, the law must stand ready to
embrace new forms of conflict resolution, and neither false comparisons
nor a reluctance to allow the law to evolve should prevent court-ordered
class-action arbitration from being embraced or from enjoying the same
favored position two-party arbitration enjoys in North Carolina.
North Carolina's allowance of consolidated arbitration is a strong
factor in favor of, and a good substantive63 starting point in the debate over,
court-ordered class-action arbitration. Jurisdictions considering
class-action arbitration for the first time often use arbitration consolidation
as a measuring stick, with those that allow court-ordered consolidation also
allowing court-ordered class-action arbitration and vice versa.64 North
Carolina's Revised Uniform Arbitration Act ("RUAA") expressly allows a
court to order consolidated arbitration when it finds four requirements are
met." One of the most important of these requirements, and a concern that
is also expressed in the certification of a class,66 is that there must be a
62. The Supreme Court of Florida has stated the following about the mutable nature of the
law:
The law is dynamic; it must approach certainty, but it can never stand still. It is of all
things an instrument of expanding life, and its principles must be so applied as to bring
within its compass new situations that constantly develop in the progress of changing
times and conditions.
Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 155 So. 136, 137 (Fla. 1934).
63. See supra note 26 (defining "substantive law").
64. See Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269, 274-76 (7th Cir. 1995) (considering
other circuits' decisions that, absent an express provision addressing consolidation, courts are
barred from requiring consolidation and using these decisions as a basis for refusing to order
class-action arbitration); Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1208-09 (Cal. 1982)
(analogizing court-ordered class-action arbitration to court-ordered consolidated arbitration),
appeal dismissed in part and rev'd in part on other grounds by Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465
U.S. 1 (1984).
65. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-569.10(a)(l)-(4) (2003). The findings that must be made for a
court to order consolidation of separate arbitration proceedings are:
(1) There are separate agreements to arbitrate or separate arbitration proceedings between
the same persons or one of them is a party to a separate agreement to arbitrate or a
separate arbitration with a third person; (2) The claims subject to the agreements to
arbitrate arise in substantial part from the same transaction or series of related
transactions; (3) The existence of a common issue of law or fact creates the possibility of
conflicting decisions in the separate arbitration proceedings; and (4) Prejudice resulting
from a failure to consolidate is not outweighed by the risk of undue delay or prejudice to
the rights of or hardship to parties opposing consolidation.
Id.
66. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2) (requiring the existence of common questions of law or fact)
2004] 2137
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common issue of either fact or law creating the possibility that separate
proceedings will result in conflicting decisions.67  However, class
certification goes a step further than consolidation and requires not only an
abstract common issue of law or fact, but that the members of the class
have similar claims or defenses.6 8 This means that where the claims of
parties to consolidated arbitration may be completely inimical, the claims
of the class as a whole must be generally the same. Furthermore, the
existence of generally common claims and facts, and the potential inability
to assert res judicata or collateral estoppel,6 9 means the risk of incurring
conflicting results and of visiting inequality on similarly situated plaintiffs
is even greater in situations that would be amenable to class-action
arbitrations than in situations that would be amenable to consolidated
arbitrations, where there may only be a common issue rather than a
common claim.
The North Carolina RUAA's position regarding consolidated
arbitration lends itself in another regard to the allowance of court-ordered
class-action arbitration when the arbitration agreement is silent on the
issue. The RUAA states that consolidation may not be ordered where the
agreement prohibits consolidation.7" Noticeably absent, however, is a
requirement that consolidation may not be ordered where the agreement is
silent as to consolidation. This omission lends itself to an interpretation
that a court may order consolidation not only where the agreement
specifically authorizes consolidation and the requirements of section ten are
met, but also where the same requirements are met and the agreement is
silent as to consolidation.7" Reasoning from similar contexts, a court
should be able to order class-wide arbitration when the agreement is silent,
just as courts have the potential ability to order consolidation when the
agreement is silent.
Considerations of the substantive law of North Carolina regarding
party intent in contract formation also weigh on the side of allowing
and (b)(1)(a) (listing the risk of inconsistent results creating "incompatible standards of conduct
for the party opposing the class" as one of four possible ways to maintain a class); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § lA-I, R. 23 (2003) (providing North Carolina's rule of civil procedure concerning class
actions); see also Crow v. Citicorp Acceptance Co., 79 N.C. App. 447, 449, 339 S.E.2d 437, 438
(1986) (discussing the basic requirements for a class-action suit in North Carolina, including the
existence of "[m]ore than one issue of law or fact common to the class"), rev'd on other grounds
by 319 N.C. 274, 354 S.E.2d 459 (1987).
67. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-569.10(a)(3) (2003).
68. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2)-(3).
69. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
70. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-569.10(c) (2003).
71. Although the language of the RUAA has not been interpreted in this manner, it is at least
a fair interpretation based on the blatant absence of a directive forbidding consolidated arbitration
where the arbitration agreement is silent on the issue.
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class-action arbitration when the contract is silent. The ascertainment of
party intent is paramount in the judicial interpretation of contracts.72
Contracts such as those at issue in Green Tree involve the drafting of the
contract and its provisions by a party with superior bargaining strength,73
and the presentation to the other party on a "take it or leave it" basis.74 The
only intent expressly presented by the language of these contracts of
adhesion is that of the drafting party, who had the ability to frame the
contract in any manner it desired within the confines of the law.
Admittedly the signature of the non-drafting party manifests assent to, and
agreement to be bound by, the terms contained in the contract,75 but there is
no opportunity for this party to add additional language to fully present its
desires and intent. The inability to state its intent in favor of class-action
arbitration should not be held against a non-drafting party when the
drafting party had ample opportunity not only to state its intent against
class-action arbitration,76 but also to have the non-drafting party assent to
the term by its signature. The judiciary, through contract interpretation,
should not put a non-drafting party in an even more subservient position
than that party already holds by the very nature of a contract of adhesion.
Construing contract silence against the stronger drafting party prevents
putting the non-drafting party in a more subservient position by protecting
a non-drafting party's ability to seek class-action arbitration where the
agreement is silent.
Another important substantive law consideration is North Carolina's
rule regarding the construction of ambiguous contract provisions.
Ambiguous contract provisions are construed against the drafting party.77
72. See Salvaggio v. New Breed Transfer Corp., 150 N.C. App. 688, 689, 564 S.E.2d 641,
643 (2002) ("The principal objective in the interpretation of a contract's provisions is to ascertain
the intent of the parties.").
73. Green Tree, by virtue of its resources and its position as the sole drafter of the contract
with no input from the other party to the contract, was the party with the superior bargaining
power in this case.
74. These contracts are commonly referred to as "contracts of adhesion." See generally 16
AM. JUR. 2D Conflict of Laws § 91 (1998) (defining adhesion contracts as those "drafted
unilaterally by the dominant party and then presented on a 'take it or leave it' basis to the weaker
party").
75. See Holder v. Aultman, 169 U.S. 81, 89 (1898) ("Then follows the signature of the
defendant ... who thereby necessarily assents to this stipulation, as well as to the other terms of
the contract."); Gans & Pugh Assocs., Inc. v. Technical Communications Corp., Nos. 93-1215 &
93-1313, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 32005, at *7 (4th Cir. Dec. 9, 1993) ("Here, the parties signed
the contract indicating their assent .... ").
76. A clause expressly forbidding class-action arbitration in a contract of adhesion is
admittedly a source of potential litigation. The Fourth Circuit has considered adhesion contracts
in the context of Fair Labor Standards Act claims. See Adkins v. Labor Ready Inc., 303 F.3d
496, 501-03 (4th Cir. 2002) (concluding that the inability to proceed on a class-action basis
cannot, without more, overcome the strong legislative preference for arbitration in FLSA cases).
77. See Novacare Orthotics & Prosthetics East, Inc. v. Speelman, 137 N.C. App. 471, 476,
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The drafter has the opportunity to phrase the contract in exactly the way it
desires, and as a result is held responsible for choosing language that lends
itself to more than one reasonable interpretation.7 8 The non-drafting party
is thereby protected from being penalized by the interpretation of
ambiguous language that it had no part in choosing. This principle of
resolving ambiguity should apply no less forcefully in cases of contract
silence.79 Were contract silence not to be treated as harshly as contract
ambiguity, the drafting party could potentially circumvent the principle of
construction of ambiguous provisions by simply arguing that the language
is silent rather than ambiguous. Equity demands that a drafting party
should receive no more favorable treatment under a contract that is silent in
regards to a particular issue than it would if the contract were ambiguous,
and where that contract is silent regarding class-action arbitration the
drafting party should have his silence held against him.
Finally, the thrust of many anti-court-ordered class-action arbitration
arguments is the language of section four of the Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA"), which, in pertinent part, provides that "upon being satisfied that
the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply
therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties
to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement."80
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has interpreted this language
to mean that if the contract does not specifically authorize class-action
arbitration, ordering class-action arbitration would not be in accordance
with the terms of the agreement and would therefore be prohibited under
section four of the FAA.8 While this conclusion is debatable,82 parties
proceeding under North Carolina's RUAA need not enter the fray. Section
seven of the RUAA, the section comparable to section four of the FAA,
simply directs the court to order the parties to arbitrate. 83 The absence of
528, S.E.2d 918, 921 (2000) (discussing an ambiguous contract provision in an employment
agreement).
78. See Rice v. Wood, 91 N.C. App. 262, 264, 371 S.E.2d 500, 502 (1988) (citing O'Grady
v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 296 N.C. 212, 227, 250 S.E.2d 587, 597 (1978)) ("Ambiguous
contracts are to be construed most strongly against the drafting party.").
79. See supra note 36 (discussing the difference between contract silence and contract
ambiguity).
80. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000) (emphasis added).
81. See Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269, 274-77 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that
section four of the FAA bars class-action [i.e., class-action arbitration] where not specifically
authorized by the terms of the agreement).
82. The Seventh Circuit's interpretation arguably presumes that the exact terms of the
arbitration provision are known and clear. However, this approach fails to consider that ordering
two-party arbitration, as the Seventh Circuit did in Champ, is no more "in accordance with the
terms" of an agreement that merely allows some unspecified form of arbitration than would be
class-action arbitration.
83. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-569.7(a)(1), (a)(2), and (b) (2003).
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the operative language "according to the terms of the agreement" 84
alleviates the need to take a side in this debate, and also eliminates one of
the most common arguments against the ordering of class-action
arbitration. 5
Court-ordered class-action arbitration is a controversial issue, with
strong opinions on both sides of the debate. Notwithstanding the opinion
of the American Arbitration Association, and unless and until the Supreme
Court firmly resolves the debate, the issue of whether to allow a court to
order class-action arbitration when the contract is silent on the issue is a
decision that resides with the legal authorities of each individual
jurisdiction. North Carolina has yet to decide this issue, but when the time
comes, the favored place arbitration holds in North Carolina, the allowance
of court-ordered consolidated arbitration, the substantive law
considerations of ascertaining party intent and resolving ambiguous
contract provisions, and the absence of the operative language of section
four of the Federal Arbitration Act in section seven of the North Carolina
Revised Uniform Arbitration Act should all be considered. These
considerations mandate that North Carolina adopt the South Carolina
approach and allow court-ordered class-action arbitration when the
arbitration agreement is silent if it would not result in prejudice and would
serve both equity and efficiency.
ROBERT JASON HERNDON
84. See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000).
85. See Champ, 55 F.3d at 274-77; see also Howard v. Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler,
977 F. Supp. 654, 665 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (citing Champ, 55 F.3d at 276-77).
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